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Anti-Forensics of Camera Identification and the
Triangle Test by Improved Fingerprint-Copy Attack
Haodong Li, Weiqi Luo, Quanquan Rao, Jiwu Huang
Abstract—The fingerprint-copy attack aims to confuse camera
identification based on sensor pattern noise. However, the triangle
test shows that the forged images undergone fingerprint-copy
attack would share a non-PRNU (Photo-response nonunifor-
mity) component with every stolen image, and thus can detect
fingerprint-copy attack. In this paper, we propose an improved
fingerprint-copy attack scheme. Our main idea is to superimpose
the estimated fingerprint into the target image dispersedly, via
employing a block-wise method and using the stolen images
randomly and partly. We also develop a practical method to
determine the strength of the superimposed fingerprint based on
objective image quality. In such a way, the impact of non-PRNU
component on the triangle test is reduced, and our improved
fingerprint-copy attack is difficultly detected. The experiments
evaluated on 2,900 images from 4 cameras show that our
scheme can effectively fool camera identification, and significantly
degrade the performance of the triangle test simultaneously.
Index Terms—Anti-forensics, camera identification, photo-
response nonuniformity, sensor fingerprint, triangle test
I. INTRODUCTION
With the various powerful image editing software, such
as GIMP and Adobe Photoshop, modifying digital images
becomes increasingly easy, which would inevitably lead to
some potential moral and/or legal consequences. Nowadays,
digital image forensics become an important issue [1]. Im-
age forensics involve many technical methods for different
applications such as detecting image compression [2]–[4],
exposing image processing history [5]–[7], revealing tampered
images [8]–[10], differentiating between photorealistic and
photographic images [11], [12], identifying the acquisition
component or device of an image [13]–[16], and so on. As
one of the important issues in image forensics, source camera
identification aims to identify which camera was used to
capture the given image. Kurosawa et al. [17] carried out
the identification utilizing fixed pattern noise (FPN) appearing
on dark frames; Kharrazi et al. [18] proposed a feature set
based on the color of pixel and image quality metrics. In [13],
Luka´sˇ et al. proposed a novel source camera identification
method based on PRNU (Photo-response nonuniformity). By
averaging the noise components of sufficient images from
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a given camera, the obtained result can be regarded as an
estimation of the PRNU component, which can serve as
a reliable and unique fingerprint for the camera. In [19],
Chen et al. proposed a method to estimate the PRNU factor
based on maximum-likelihood approach, and shown that the
method outperformed that proposed in [13]. Besides, sev-
eral improved PRNU-based methods have been proposed for
source camera identification. For example, Li [20] proposed
an enhanced method to suppress some unwanted components
within the noise components. Hu et al. [21] proposed a way
to construct camera fingerprints from all of the three color
channels via using the characteristics of the color filter array
(CFA) structure. Kang et al. [22] introduced a new detection
method to lower the false positive rate. Bayram et al. [23]
tried to reduce the computational expensive of conventional
approaches through binarizing the sensor fingerprints. In [24]
and [25], two methods are proposed to estimate the sensor
fingerprints based on local information of image via block-
wise strategies.
On the opposite side of forensics, however, a wise attacker
can perform some anti-forensic operations to confuse the
corresponding forensic methods. Studying the anti-forensic
methods is very important for researchers, since it can help
to discover the limitations of current forensic methods and
further improve their performance. Up to now, several typical
anti-forensic works have been reported. For instance, Stamm
and Liu [26] proposed a scheme to conceal the traces left by
digital image compression. In [27] and [28], some methods
are proposed to trick the resampling detector [5] and the sensor
pattern noise based image forgeries detector [13], respectively.
In [29], the authors proposed a method to remove the PRNU
noise within an image so that it would not be matched with
its source camera. Some methods such as [30] and [31] try to
confuse the source camera identification as described above
via fingerprint-copy attack. These methods firstly estimate the
fingerprint of a camera CA from some stolen images, and then
superimpose it into a target image taken by a different camera
CE to disguise the resulting image as one taken by camera CA.
Most existing PRNU based camera identification algorithms
would incorrectly identify that the resulting forged image is
taken by camera CA rather than camera CE .
Forensics and anti-forensics is like the cat-and-mouse game.
Recently, Goljan et al. [30] proposed the triangle test method
to expose the fingerprint-copy attack. They pointed out that
there would be a common non-PRNU component shared by
those stolen images and the resulting forged images after per-
forming the fingerprint-copy attack. Based on such a property,
it can identify the stolen images from some candidate images
2using the individual test, determine whether a set of candidate
images contain some stolen images using the pooled test, and
directly detect the forged images using the multiple forgeries
test.
In this paper, we propose an anti-forensic method to de-
ceive both camera identification and the triangle test. The
main idea is to randomly select just a small part of stolen
images for fingerprint estimation, and then superimpose the
estimated fingerprint into the target image block by block.
By doing so, we are able to reduce impact of the non-PRNU
components from the stolen images, and thus it would deceive
the triangle test. Moreover, we propose a practical way to
determine the strength of the superimposed fingerprint based
on adjusting PSNR, so we can overcome the drawback of
conventional fingerprint-copy attack that the true fingerprint
needs to be available. In our experiments, 2,900 images from
three different camera brands (four camera individuals) and
three different kinds of the triangle tests have been included.
The experimental results have shown that the proposed method
outperforms the conventional fingerprint-copy attack method
[30] and degrades the performance of triangle test significantly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives a brief overview of some related techniques on
camera identification based on PRNU. Section III presents
the proposed anti-forensic method, including superimpose the
estimated fingerprint dispersedly and determine the fingerprint
strength according to PSNR. Section IV shows the experimen-
tal results and discussions. Finally, the concluding remarks and
future works are given in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we will introduce some related works in-
cluding the camera identification method based on PRNU, the
conventional fingerprint-copy attack method and the triangle
test method. Beforehand, some notations used in this paper are
given: everywhere a boldface symbol represents a matrix, e.g.
X; for two matrices X and Y with the same dimensions, their
element-wise product and element-wise division are denoted
as Z= XY and Z= X/Y respectively.
A. Camera Identification Based on PRNU
Due to the manufacturing imperfection and the nonunifor-
mity of silicon wafers, the recorded pixels on camera sensors
vary from each other even if the sensors are exposed to
the same illumination. Therefore, a kind of pattern noise
called PRNU exists in all sensor-based cameras, and it is
introduced to every image taken by camera. Such noise is
independent of the environment. More importantly, the noises
of all images taken by a same camera are highly correlated,
while the correlations among the noises of those images taken
by different cameras would be much weaker. Based on this
property, therefore, the pattern noise can be regarded as a
unique fingerprint of a digital camera.
In [19], Chen et al. proposed a maximum likelihood method
to estimate the PRNU multiplicative factor Kˆ of a camera CA
Kˆ=
N
∑
i=1
WiIi
N
∑
i=1
I2i
(1)
where I1, . . . ,IN are the N images taken by camera CA that
are used to estimate the fingerprint, and Wi = Ii −F(Ii) is
the noise residual of Ii, where F is the wavelet denoising
filter [32]. For a given image J, the presence of the camera
fingerprint can be evaluated by the correlation detector:
ρ = corr(WJ,JKˆ) (2)
where Kˆ is the estimated fingerprint of camera CA computed
by Eq. (1). Thus, camera identification can be achieved with a
detector based on the statistic ρ . By setting a false alarm rate
Pf a (i.e. the probability of that those images taken by other
cameras are identified as being taken by camera CA), some
training images taken by other cameras are used to determine
the detection threshold t1. Then for a testing image J, its
corresponding ρ is obtained based on Eq. (2). If ρ > t1, J is
decided to be taken by camera CA; otherwise, J is not taken
by camera CA. It is noted that the PRNU based correlation
detection is an important method in camera identification, its
reliability and effectiveness have been verified in [13] and [19].
B. Fingerprint-copy Attack
The purpose of fingerprint-copy attack [30] is to confuse
those threshold-based camera identification algorithms. As-
sume that Alice is the victim and Eve is the attacker. Alice has
posted some images taken by her camera CA on some websites,
and Eve steals N of these images. In order to make a forgery,
Eve can firstly suppress the fingerprint within a target image
J taken by a different camera CE . Next, she estimates a fake
fingerprint KˆE of camera CA with Eq. (1) using the stolen
images. Finally, she superimposes the fake fingerprint KˆE into
J and makes a forgery J′ as
J′ = [J(1+αKˆE)] (3)
where the symbol [·] is the rounding and truncating operation
(a real number is rounded to its nearest integer, and it will be
truncated to 0 or 255 if it is outside the range of [0,255]), and
the parameter α > 0 denotes the fingerprint strength. In order
to create a good forgery, Eve must set a proper parameter α to
make the response of the camera identification detector (e.g.
the correlation detector using Eq. (2)) on J′ is “natural” as if
J′ was indeed taken by camera CA. In this case, the fingerprint
strength α should be adjusted according to the true fingerprint
K of camera CA.
Please note that two issues should be further considered
in this fingerprint-copy attack strategy. Firstly, is it a good
strategy to use all the N stolen images for estimating the whole
fake fingerprint KˆE? Secondly, how to adjust the fingerprint
strength α to make the correlation computed by Eq. (2) on J′
“natural”? Since Eve cannot access the true fingerprint K of
camera CA, it seems unreasonable for her to obtain a natural α
3J
W
′
corr corr
corr
ˆ
A
K
I
W
Fig. 1. Illustration of the triangle test.
in real applications. To avoid this assumption, we will develop
a method in Section III via adjusting PSNR to determine the
proper fingerprint strength.
C. Triangle Test
In order to prove her innocence, Alice can perform the
triangle test [30] to expose the existence of fingerprint-copy
attack.
One possible scenario is that Alice only gets a forged image
J′, and all the N images stolen by Eve belong to a large
database, containing Nc (Nc >N) images, which is available to
Alice. In such a case, Alice tries to identify the stolen images
from the image database so as to prove J′ is a forgery. Since
Alice has the camera CA, she can obtain a good estimated
fingerprint KˆA of camera CA via Eq. (1) using some well
designed images (e.g. blue sky images) which are not in the
image database Nc. Then for each candidate image I in the
database, she computes the three correlations between the
noise residual of I, the noise residual of J′, and the estimated
fingerprint KˆA, denoted as cI,J′ , cI,KˆA
, and cJ′,KˆA
respectively,
as shown in Fig. 1.
In [30], the authors obtained an estimation of cI,J′ (denoted
as cˆI,J′ ) from the two other correlations cI,KˆA
and cJ′,KˆA
. They
further showed that for a forged image J′, the cI,J′ and cˆI,J′
were highly linear dependent if I was not used by Eve. If
the image I was previously used by Eve, however, such a
linear property would be destroyed and cI,J′ would present a
higher value (Please refer to Fig. 6(a) for example), since I and
J′ share a non-PRNU component in this case. Therefore, via
fitting a straight line cI,J′ = λ cˆI,J′+η (λ and η are the fitting
parameters) using some images that have not been used by Eve
and obtaining the pdf (Probability Density Function): fJ′(x)≈
Pr(cI,J′−λ cˆI,J′−η = x|cˆI,J′), Alice has two alternative options
to perform the triangle test as follows.
(a) The individual test. Alice can set a threshold t2 on a
certain false alarm rate, and test each candidate image I
individually by evaluating cI,J′−λ cˆI,J′−η . If the value
is larger than t2, then I is used by Eve.
(b) The pooled test, namely, testing all Nc candidate images
at once whether cI,J′ − λ cˆI,J′ − η ∼ fJ′(x) is satisfied.
If the answer is not, there would be at least one stolen
image among those candidate ones.
Another possible scenario is that Alice may access more
than one forged image such as J′1 and J
′
2, and it is assumed that
these images are created with a same fake fingerprint KˆE. In
this case, since J′1 and J
′
2 would share a non-PRNU component
coming from KˆE and some common noises introduced by
the camera CE , Alice can reveal the forgeries by running the
triangle test on WJ′1
, WJ′2
, and KˆA without accessing the N
stolen images used by Eve.
III. THE PROPOSED FINGERPRINT-COPY ATTACK SCHEME
To design a successful fingerprint-copy attack, the two
following requirements should be carefully considered.
(a) Confuse the camera identification. Since Eve’s original
intention is to frame Alice as the owner of the forged
image J′. Therefore, after superimposing a fake finger-
print into a target image, it should guarantee that the
camera identification detectors cannot distinguish the
forged image J′ from the original ones.
(b) Fool the triangle test. To avoid being detected, the per-
formance of the triangle test evaluated on the resulting
forgeries should degrade significantly after using the
fingerprint-copy attack.
There is a tradeoff between the two requirements. Usually,
the more strength of a fake fingerprint is superimposed, the
easier to confuse the camera identification (i.e. requirement
#a), however, the better detection performance of the triangle
test (i.e. requirement #b) would be obtained. Based on the
analysis in Section II-C, we find that the key idea of the
triangle test is to detect the non-PRNU component from
the stolen images. If we can reduce the impact of the non-
PRNU component on the triangle test, it is expected that the
performance of the triangle test will drop significantly.
A. A Block-wise and Randomized Fingerprint-copy Scheme
Unlike the conventional fingerprint-copy attack described
Section II-B, in this subsection we introduce a block-wise and
randomized fingerprint-copy scheme. Assuming that we have
stolen N images taken by Alice’s camera, we produce the fake
fingerprint for different blocks of the target image by just using
a randomly selected subset of the N stolen images. The details
are as follows.
Firstly, we divide all stolen images I1, . . . ,IN (assuming that
their sizes are the same as the target one) and the target image
J into n non-overlapping blocks with the size of l × l. For
each block Jb of image J, where b= 1,2, . . . ,n, we randomly
select r (r<N) stolen images I′1, . . . ,I
′
r and calculate KˆE,b ac-
cording to Eq. (1) using the corresponding blocks I′1,b . . .I
′
r,b
of the selected stolen images, then we superimpose this fake
fingerprint block KˆE,b into the corresponding block Jb within
the target image,
J′b = [Jb(1+αbKˆE,b)] (4)
where αb is the fingerprint strength for the bth block. We will
discuss how to select a proper αb in Section III-B.
In such a way, the fake fingerprint superimposed into
the target image J is dispersed, so the common non-PRNU
component between each stolen image Ii and the forged image
J′ is also dispersed. As a result, it is expected that the impact of
the non-PRNU component on the triangle test will be reduced.
Based on our experiments (please see Section IV-C to Section
4Fig. 2. Original image (left) taken by a Nikon D7000 camera and the forged image (right) created by the proposed method with N = 100, A= 50 and r= 10.
IV-E), the performance of the triangle test is significantly de-
graded when applying the proposed fingerprint-copy scheme.
On the other hand, it is noted that the dispersion of fingerprint
has slight effect on the performance for confusing the camera
identification. Based on our experimental results (please see
Section IV-B), at the same level of PSNR, the proposed
method still achieves similar results for camera identification
compared to the conventional method [30].
B. Determining the Fingerprint Strength
An important factor in Eq. 4 is the fingerprint strength αb.
Since a forger does not know the true fingerprintK in practice,
we try to determine αb based on the objective image quality
measured by PSNR as the following equation,
α∗b ∈ {αb|PSNR(J
′
b,Jb) = A} (5)
where PSNR(J′b,Jb) stands for the PSNR between an image
block after and before superimposing the fake fingerprint, and
A is a target PSNR value. In other words, we select α∗b so
that the PSNR between the forged image block J′b and the
source image block Jb is equal to the given PSNR value A.
In practice, it is not easy to obtain the solution α∗b directly.
Besides, there would be several αb that satisfy PSNR(J
′
b,Jb) =
A due to the rounding/truncation errors incurred in generating
J′b. Therefore, we use binary search to approximately find out
α∗b , which can ensure PSNR(J
′
b,Jb) is as close to A as possible.
Based on the work in [30], we note that the PSNR between
the original image and the forged image after the fingerprint-
copy attack with the “natural” parameter α would approxi-
mately fall in the range of [47.6 dB, 58.7 dB]. Therefore, we
can select the value of A within this range. Usually, the larger
the A to be selected, the smaller the α∗b is obtained, and vice
versa.
C. Implementation of the Proposed Method
Based on the experiments and discussions in the Section
III-A and III-B, we summarize the procedures for creating a
forged image J′ as follows.
(a) Divide the target image J and all the stolen images
I1, . . . ,IN into n non-overlapping small blocks. For each
block Jb (b= 1,2, . . . ,n), randomly select r (r ≤ N) cor-
responding stolen image blocks I′1,b, . . . ,I
′
r,b to estimate
KˆE,b according to Eq. (1).
(b) For each block Jb, we set A (the target PSNR) for
adjusting fingerprint strength, and then we find the proper
fingerprint strength α∗b according to Eq. (5), finally su-
perimpose the estimated fingerprint KˆE,b into Jb with Eq.
(4) (set αb as α
∗
b ) to obtain a forged block J
′
b.
(c) After processing all the blocks Jb (b = 1,2, . . . ,n) as
described in step (b), we combine all J′b (b= 1,2, . . . ,n)
together to generate a forged image J′.
By choosing proper parameters (i.e. r and A), we
can achieve a good tradeoff between the two require-
ments described previously. Comparing with the conventional
fingerprint-copy attack [30], the main difference of the pro-
posed method described above is that we superimpose the
estimated fingerprint into a target image block by block rather
than the whole image, and we just randomly use some stolen
images to estimate the corresponding fingerprint for each
forged image block rather than all stolen images. Furthermore,
we obtain the proper fingerprint strength via adjusting the
PSNR rather than using a natural α which is not available
in practice.
An image forgery made by the proposed method with
parameter N = 100, A = 50 and r = 10 is illustrated in
Fig. 2. Since the PSNR between this forgery and its original
counterpart is 50 dB, no perceptible artifacts are introduced in
the resulting image. This forgery can successfully confuse the
camera identification and fool the triangle test simultaneously.
More comparative results will be given in the Section IV.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
All our experiments are conducted on 2,900 images taken
by four different digital cameras, including Nikon D7000 #1,
Nikon D7000 #2, Canon EOS 400D, and Pentax K20D. The
number of images for each camera and their imaginary owners
are shown in Table I. Please note that there are two digital
cameras with the same model, Nikon D7000 (i.e. CA and
CE1), since Eve may create the image forgery according to the
model of Alice’s camera to avoid introducing other detectable
artifacts, such as inconsistent CFA [33] and quantization
matrix [34]. Besides, camera CE2 and CE3 with different
brands and models are also included in our experiments.
In order to reduce the computational complexity, all images
are center cropped with the size of 1024×1024, which are then
JPEG compressed with a high quality factor 90 just as did in
5TABLE I
IMAGE DATABASES USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS
Camera name Camera brand Number of images Owner
CA Nikon D7000 #1 2000 Alice
CE1 Nikon D7000 #2 300 Eve
CE2 Canon EOS 400D 300 Eve
CE3 Pentax K20D 300 Eve
TABLE II
Pf a (%) AND PD (%) FOR DIFFERENT BLOCK SIZE
l 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
Pf a 96.33 99.33 100 100 100 100 100
PD 24.56 44.22 54.19 58.29 56.55 49.35 31.21
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Fig. 3. True correlation cI,J′ vs. estimated correlation cˆI,J′ for the forged image #198 in CE1. The blue circles, black dots, and red dashed lines denote the
images used by Eve, the images not used by Eve, and the detection thresholds, respectively. The dash-dotted lines are fitted lines of the black dots. Please
note that the results for other images are similar based on our experiments.
[30] to avoid the inconsistence of JPEG quantization matrices.
We assume that the attacker Eve steals N images from CA
and creates some forgeries for each target image from CE1,
CE2 and CE3 using the conventional fingerprint-copy attack
[30], and the proposed method with different parameters. For
a fair comparison, we also adjust the α in Eq. (3) based on
PSNR like Eq. (5) when applying the conventional method,
since Eve cannot obtain the true fingerprint K of camera CA
in real forensic cases. As it did in [30], the target images
are slightly denoised by the wavelet filter [32] with parameter
σ = 1 to suppress their own fingerprints and other possible
artifacts before superimposing the fake estimated fingerprint.
A. Parameter Selection
1) Selection of Parameter l: Since the proposed method
works in a block-wise manner, the parameter l (i.e. block size)
would have impact on the anti-forensic performance. In order
to select a proper value of l, we have conducted the following
experiments.
By setting N=100, A=50, r=10, and l ∈
{8,16,32,64,128,256,512}, we create 300×7 (with regard
to different l) forged images from camera CE1 using the
proposed method. Then we investigate the performance of
camera identification and individual triangle test, respectively.
For the forged images, we aim to increase the false alarm
rate of camera identification (Pf a) and decrease the correct
detection rate of triangle test (PD). The experimental results
are shown in Table II. From Table II, it is observed that we
obtain Pf a = 100% when l ≥ 32, meaning that the camera
identification is successfully deceived. When l is very small
(e.g. 8) or very large (e.g. 512), the obtained PD of triangle
test is relatively smaller than those obtained with a middle
range l (e.g. 1024 or 256). Due to a small l would lead to
poor performance for deceiving the camera identification, it
may be better to choose a large l.
However, our further analysis indicates that a too large l
would bring some potential risks. As illustrated in Fig. 3,
the true correlation values (blue circles) for relatively small l
(i.e. Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b)) are always close to the detection
threshold (red dashed line), and most of them are less than
8× 10−3. However, some of the true correlation values for a
large l (i.e. Fig. 3(c)) are significantly larger than the threshold.
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Fig. 4. Boxplots of the correlation values for images from different datasets
(the forged images are created with N = 100, A= 50, r = 10).
Comparing Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), it is observed that many
true correlation values (larger than 1×10−2 in this experiment)
obtained with l = 512 are even larger than those obtained
with the conventional method (l = 1024). These values can be
regarded as outlier data, which can be used as a strong sign
for image forgery. Such a case is not shown if we just focus
on the PD of triangle test, but the one who attempts to perform
anti-forensics must pay attention to it in a real scenario. To
avoid such traces, l should not be too large. Thus, we select
l = 32 in the following experiments.
2) Selection of Parameter A and r: There are two important
parameters in the proposed method, i.e., the target PSNR A
for setting the parameter α∗b in Eq. (5) and the number of
randomly selected images r.
It is noted that the PSNR between the images before and
after the fingerprint-copy attack would approximately fall in
the range of [47.6 dB, 58.7 dB] (please refer to Table I in
[30]). Therefore, we set A as 50 dB and 55 dB to evaluate
the performance of the proposed method. Since the proposed
method ensures the PSNR for each image block is as close
to A as possible, the PSNR for the whole image is also very
close to the A.
Another parameter need to be determined is r. To confuse
the threshold-based correlation detector, we should guarantee
that the correlation between the noise residual WJ′ of the
forged image and the true fingerprint K of camera CA is
large enough. Usually, for a given A (i.e. the strength of the
estimated fingerprint superimposed into J is given), the more
stolen images we used for estimating the fingerprint, the larger
the correlation we can obtain, while the poorer performance
for attacking the triangle test (refer to Table IV for more
details). In order to select a proper r, the following experiments
are conducted.
Firstly, we determine the threshold t1 for the threshold-
based correlation detector. We collect 300 blue sky images
taken by camera CA and obtain a good estimation Kˆ of
the true fingerprint of camera CA. Then we use the 2,000
images from camera CA as positive samples and collect
2,000 images from the Dresden Image Database (available at
http://forensics.inf.tu-dresden.de/ddimgdb) taken by 10 differ-
ent cameras (including 5 different camera models, denote as
Cother) as negative samples. We calculate the correlations of
these images with Kˆ according to Eq. (2). Finally, we set
 r
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Fig. 5. Pf a of 900 forged images for the camera identification with increasing
the parameter r ranging from 1 to 20.
the false alarm rate Pf a as 10
−3 to obtain the threshold t1
(t1 = 0.0046 in this experiment). If the correlation of an image
is larger than t1, the detector would identify the image as being
taken by camera CA. In Fig. 4, the boxplots of the correlations
for all the images from different cameras are illustrated. It
is observed that almost all images from camera CA (see the
leftmost boxplot) and from other cameras (i.e. Cother, CE1,
CE2 and CE3, see the two boxplots in the middle) are clearly
separated by the threshold t1.
By setting N = 100, we try to analyze the effect of the
parameter r on the correlation detection. Please note that
similar results can be obtained for other values, such as
N = 20,50,200 and 300 based on our experiments. Fig. 5
shows the Pf a of the 900 forged images (i.e. the percentage
of those forged images whose correlations are larger than the
threshold t1) with increasing the parameter r from 1 to 20. It
can be observed that the Pf a would increase with increasing
the parameter r. At the beginning, e.g., r ranging from 1 to 9,
the Pf a increases sharply. When r is larger than 15, it increases
slightly, which means that there is no need to use all the stolen
images for fingerprint estimation, since the more stolen images
to be used for estimating the fake fingerprint, the more easily
the triangle test detects the resulting forgeries. Based on the
above analysis, we evaluate the proposed method with the
parameter r ∈ {10,15} in the following experiments.
B. Experiment #1: Confusing Camera Identification
In this experiment, we will evaluate the proposed method
for confusing the camera identification. In this case, each of
the image forgeries is tested by the correlation detector, and a
higher value of Pf a means the better anti-forensic performance.
The experimental results evaluated on those forgeries from
the three different cameras are shown in Table III. It can
be observed that the parameter A is the most influential
factor for the detection performance, since it determines the
fingerprint strength. Usually, the smaller A we use, the larger
the fingerprint strength is, and thus the better performance for
confusing the camera identification will be achieved. When
A = 50 dB, both the conventional method and the proposed
method can achieve very high Pf a (all larger than 97%). As
an example, we show the correlations for the forged images
from CE1, CE2 and CE3 made by the proposed method with
7TABLE III
Pf a (%) OF CAMERA IDENTIFICATION FOR THE FORGERIES FROM THREE CAMERAS.
N 20 50 100 200 300
CE1
A= 50
Method in [30] 100 100 100 100 100
Proposed (r = 15) 100 100 100 100 100
Proposed (r = 10) 100 99.67 100 99.67 99.67
A= 55
Method in [30] 97.67 99.33 100 100 100
Proposed (r = 15) 96.00 96.00 96.00 95.67 95.67
Proposed (r = 10) 94.00 93.67 94.33 93.00 93.00
CE2
A= 50
Method in [30] 99.67 100 100 100 100
Proposed (r = 15) 99.33 99.33 99.33 99.33 99.00
Proposed (r = 10) 99.00 99.00 99.00 98.67 99.00
A= 55
Method in [30] 92.67 97.67 98.67 99.00 100
Proposed (r = 15) 83.00 84.00 85.33 82.67 82.33
Proposed (r = 10) 79.33 79.33 80.33 76.67 78.00
CE3
A= 50
Method in [30] 99.67 99.67 99.67 99.67 99.67
Proposed (r = 15) 99.00 98.67 99.33 99.00 98.67
Proposed (r = 10) 98.33 98.00 98.00 98.00 97.67
A= 55
Method in [30] 89.67 96.00 99.00 99.67 99.67
Proposed (r = 15) 86.67 86.33 87.33 84.67 85.33
Proposed (r = 10) 80.67 82.00 82.33 81.33 81.00
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Fig. 6. Correlations cI,J′ vs. cˆI,J′ for the forged image shown in Fig. 2 using the conventional method [30] and the proposed method. The parameters are
N = 100, r = 10, A= 50 dB. The dash-dotted line is the fitted straight line of the black dots.
N = 100, A= 50, r = 10 in the rightmost boxplot in Fig. 4. It
is observed that the distribution of correlations for the forged
images and that for the images from CA are quite similar.
However, the Pf a will decrease when A increases to 55 dB, and
the decrements for the proposed method are severer comparing
with the conventional method. Besides, we find that the Pf a
changes slightly for the parameter N. Based on Table III,
giving A and r, the changes of Pf a for the proposed method
are less than 4% when N ranges from 20 to 300. Overall,
the experimental results show that we can set A as 50 dB to
make almost all forged images successfully confuse the camera
identification.
C. Experiment #2: Attacking Individual Triangle Test
In this experiment, we will evaluate the proposed method for
attacking individual triangle test. In this scenario, Alice try to
detect the forgeries via identifying those images stolen by Eve,
so a good anti-forensic method should reduce the detection rate
PD of individual test as far as possible. In our experiments, we
firstly estimate an approximate fingerprint KˆA using NA = 70
blue sky images from camera CA. [30] has pointed out that
it is not necessary for Alice to work with a better quality
fingerprint than Eve, and NA is recommended from 15 to 70.
For each forged image J′, the individual test is performed on
600 images taken by camera CA. Among the 600 images, N
(N ∈ {20,50,100,200,300} in our experiments) stolen images
used by Eve are treated as candidate images, and the remaining
600−N images are used to estimate the pdf fJ′(x) for J
′ (refer
to Section II-C for the details of fJ′(x)).
In Fig. 6, we plot the cI,J′ versus cˆI,J′ for two forgeries
created from the image example illustrated in Fig. 2 with the
conventional method [30] and the proposed method, respec-
tively. Here, the parameters are set as N = 100, A = 50 dB,
and r = 10. Compared with the Fig. 6(a), it is observed that
the separations between the images used and those not used
by Eve significantly deteriorate after applying the proposed
method. When PFA (i.e., the false alarm rate of triangle test)
is set as 10−3, the PD for the conventional method is as high
as 96%, while the PD for the proposed method is only 39%.
To further show the effectiveness of the proposed method,
we conduct the individual test on all the forgeries made with
different methods and parameters. The average PD evaluated
on 300 forged images from each of the three cameras are
shown in Table IV. Overall, the proposed method outperforms
the conventional method significantly, especially when N is
large. For instance, when N > 50 and A= 50 dB, the average
decrements of PD for the proposed method are over 48%
comparing with the conventional method. Besides, the larger
8TABLE IV
THE AVERAGE PD (%) OF INDIVIDUAL TRIANGLE TEST FOR THE FORGERIES FROM THREE CAMERAS.
N 20 50 100 200 300
CE1
A= 50
Method in [30] 99.30 97.74 92.10 80.12 67.48
Proposed (r = 15) 98.07 89.55 62.97 26.30 11.65
Proposed (r = 10) 97.02 85.22 54.19 18.06 7.25
A= 55
Method in [30] 87.20 78.72 63.80 41.80 27.58
Proposed (r = 15) 82.67 50.47 18.95 3.17 1.20
Proposed (r = 10) 77.33 39.65 12.03 1.98 0.88
CE2
A= 50
Method in [30] 97.57 92.86 82.39 64.44 51.60
Proposed (r = 15) 95.95 77.79 43.79 13.22 5.13
Proposed (r = 10) 93.65 70.11 34.38 8.34 3.07
A= 55
Method in [30] 75.82 60.28 43.75 23.92 14.87
Proposed (r = 15) 67.57 31.38 8.41 1.51 0.69
Proposed (r = 10) 60.23 23.09 4.98 0.95 0.47
CE3
A= 50
Method in [30] 97.92 95.15 88.58 75.23 63.08
Proposed (r = 15) 96.37 85.73 59.14 23.22 9.83
Proposed (r = 10) 94.47 80.33 50.10 16.22 6.26
A= 55
Method in [30] 83.00 75.35 61.55 40.68 28.71
Proposed (r = 15) 77.52 50.59 20.41 3.58 1.39
Proposed (r = 10) 72.45 41.28 13.59 2.06 0.86
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Fig. 7. The average PD of the pooled test for the conventional method [30] and the proposed method as a function of the ratio N/Nc on 100 images at
PFA = 10
−3, where N is the number of images used by Eve to estimate the fake fingerprint, and Nc is the number of candidate images. The parameters are
A= 50 dB and r = 10.
the number of stolen images N is, the poorer detection
performance for the individual triangle test we achieve. When
N > 100, PD for the proposed method with A = 55 dB are
less than 4%, meaning that the individual triangle test would
almost become useless in these cases.
D. Experiment #3: Attacking Pooled Triangle Test
In this experiment, we will evaluate the proposed method
for attacking the pooled triangle test. Firstly, we randomly
select 100 target images from each of the camera CE1,
CE2 and CE3 respectively, and create totally 1,800 forgeries
using the selected images with the proposed method and the
conventional method and the parameters N ∈ {100,200,300},
A = 50 dB, and r = 10. Please note that the two methods
with these parameters can obtain similar good results (all
Pf a > 96%) on confusing camera identification according to
the experiment #1. For each forged image J′, the pdf fJ′(x) is
estimated from 500 images taken by camera CA which are not
used by Eve. Assume that the N stolen images are a subset of
the Nc candidate images I from camera CA (Nc ≥ N). For a
given ratio N/Nc, k= 60 images are randomly selected out of
the Nc candidate images and their statistics cI,J′ −λ cˆI,J′ −η
are computed. If the p−value of these statistics is less than
PFA = 10
−3, we determine J′ is a forgery. Like what was done
in [30], we repeat the process of random selecting k images
and making a decision on J′ 10,000 times, and finally obtain
the PD for J
′, i.e., the probability of that J′ is correctly detected
as a forgery over the 10,000 times.
Fig. 7 shows the ratio N/Nc (please note that N is set
as 100, 200 or 300, Nc would change with different ratio
of N/Nc.) versus the average PD on 100 images from the
three cameras. It is observed that the conventional method
[30] can be easily detected by the pooled test, especially when
N/Nc > 0.5 (PD > 88% in such cases). However, the proposed
method can decrease the PD significantly. For a given N, here
N = 100,200,300, the decrements of PD averaging over the
three cameras with all ratio N/Nc are 10.0%, 22.1%, and
29.9%, respectively. From Fig. 7, it is also observed that the PD
will increase when the ratio N/Nc ranging from 0 to 1. When
N/Nc≤ 0.4 and N ≥ 200, the average PD is smaller than 53.4%
for the proposed method. Even when N/Nc = 1 (i.e. the set
of the stolen images for Eve is exactly the same as the set of
candidate images used in the pool test for Alice, and this case
seems unlikely to happen in practice for detectors), the average
PD for the proposed method is still less than 88.3% when
N ≥ 200, while the average PD for the conventional method
[30] is larger than 95.9%.
9TABLE V
THE AVERAGE PD (%) OF MULTIPLE FORGERIES TRIANGLE TEST FOR THE FORGERIES FROM THREE CAMERAS.
N 20 50 100 200 300
CE1
A= 50
Method in [30] 99.97 99.97 100 99.90 99.97
Proposed (r = 15) 99.73 93.61 76.19 54.98 42.11
Proposed (r = 10) 98.36 86.15 63.11 39.13 24.82
A= 55
Method in [30] 73.78 71.87 74.52 69.97 72.54
Proposed (r = 15) 66.92 35.15 16.02 4.38 2.37
Proposed (r = 10) 52.81 21.91 6.19 2.64 1.64
CE2
A= 50
Method in [30] 99.50 99.13 98.90 98.39 98.09
Proposed (r = 15) 99.46 91.10 74.05 60.10 53.01
Proposed (r = 10) 97.16 82.11 63.61 51.07 47.53
A= 55
Method in [30] 72.74 72.41 72.51 71.47 71.74
Proposed (r = 15) 68.43 51.40 45.52 44.45 44.21
Proposed (r = 10) 60.00 46.92 44.35 42.51 44.05
CE3
A= 50
Method in [30] 99.30 99.23 99.20 99.00 98.70
Proposed (r = 15) 99.23 95.59 90.57 81.00 72.91
Proposed (r = 10) 98.13 92.31 84.58 74.11 67.53
A= 55
Method in [30] 89.36 89.60 89.97 89.00 87.32
Proposed (r = 15) 88.33 74.88 65.72 60.77 59.73
Proposed (r = 10) 83.68 70.30 62.58 58.70 60.03
E. Experiment #4: Attacking Multiple Forgeries Triangle Test
In this experiment, we will evaluate the proposed method
for attacking the multiple forgeries triangle test. The number of
the images stolen by Eve is set as N ∈ {20,50,100,200,300},
where the N stolen images are belong to 600 images from
camera CA. For each forgery J
′, the pdf fJ′(x) is estimated by
600−N images not used by Eve just as we did in experiment
#2, and the candidate images in this case are the other 299
(=300-1) forgeries from the same camera generated with the
same method and parameters. Thus the PD of J
′ means the
probability of that the 299 forgeries are correctly detected by
the multiple forgeries test. For each method with some given
parameters, we perform multiple forgeries test on 100 forgeries
from camera CE1, CE2 and CE3 respectively. The average PD
are listed in the Table V.
From Table V, it is observed that the PD for the conventional
method with A = 50 dB are larger than 98% even when
N = 300. Overall, the proposed method can effectively degrade
the PD, especially when N is large. Taking A= 50, N = 300 and
r= 10 as an example, the average decrement for the proposed
method is 52.3% comparing to the conventional method. It
is also observed that the proposed method performs better on
camera CE1 than camera CE2 and CE3. For example, when
N = 100 and r= 10, the PD of the proposed method for camera
CE1 is 6.19%, while the PD for camera CE2 and CE3 are
44.35% and 62.58%, respectively. The possible reason may be
the effects of sensor noises and/or compression artifacts intro-
duced by the digital cameras. Since camera CE1 and CA are
with the same model, most hardware and software employed
within the two cameras may be very similar or exactly the
same. Therefore, it is expected that the non-PRNU components
of their resulting images are relatively similar compared with
those images from different brands and models of camera CE2
and CE3, thus the forgeries from camera CE2 and CE3 are
easier to be detected. In our future research, we will further
analyze the key factors inside different cameras that influence
the detection performance of the multiple forgeries triangle
test.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we first analyze the limitations of the con-
ventional fingerprint-copy attack, and then propose an im-
proved fingerprint-copy attack scheme via estimating the fake
fingerprint from a randomly selected subset of the stolen
images and superimposing it into the target image in a
dispersive manner. The proposed scheme achieves a good
tradeoff between the two requirements as described in Section
III. The extensive experimental results evaluated on 2,900
images from 4 different cameras have shown that the proposed
method can successfully confuse the camera identification
(refer to Experiment #1) and attack the triangle test in three
different forensic scenarios (refer to Experiments #2, #3 and
#4 respectively). It significantly outperforms the conventional
fingerprint-copy attack [30], especially when the number of
stolen images N is large enough, e.g. N > 100.
Though the proposed method is effective, it still has some
limitations. Firstly, like most current anti-forensics works
aiming at some certain forensic methods (such as [26], [27],
and [31]), the proposed method is designed against one of
the most popular camera identification methods [19] and the
triangle test [30]. Thus it is difficult to attack other camera
identification methods that are not based on PRNU. Secondly,
the local textural information within the image has not been
fully considered in the proposed scheme. It is promising that
one can obtain better anti-forensic results by setting different
fingerprint strengths for different image blocks according to
the textural complexity. In the future, we will try to develop
an adaptive way for adjusting the fingerprint strength to further
improve the proposed scheme.
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